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Attorneys' Malpractice
William K. Qardner*
Actions and Proceedings Against Attorneys
Degree of skill, care and diligence required of attorneys

A

N

ATTORNEY is not an insurer of the result of a case in which

he is employed, without a special contract to that effect,
nor can more than ordinary skill, care and diligence be required
of him without such contract; and where an attorney has acted
in good faith and with a fair degree of intelligence in the discharge of his duties under the usual implied contract, any error
which he may make must be so gross as to render wholly improbable any disagreement among good lawyers as to the manner
of the performance of the services in the given case before the
attorney can be held responsible.1
The undertaking of an attorney is not that he possesses
perfect legal knowledge, or the highest degree of skill in relation
to the business he undertakes, nor that he will conduct it with
the greatest degree of diligence, care and prudence, but that he
possesses the ordinary legal knowledge and skill common to
members of the profession, and that in the discharge of his
care
duties he will exercise ordinary and reasonable diligence,
2
negligence.
be
would
so
do
to
failure
The
and prudence.
An attorney who contracts to prosecute an action in behalf
of a client impliedly represents that he possesses the requisite
degree of learning, skill and ability necessary to the practice of
his profession, and which others similarly situated ordinarily
possess; that he will exercise his best judgment in the prosecution of the litigation, and that he will exercise reasonable and
ordinary care and diligence in the use of his skill and in the
application of his knowledge to his client's cause. When he acts
* Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall Law School; Member of the Ohio
Bar; etc.
[Editor's Note: The substance of this article will appear as part of
Chapter 124, Vol. 4, Gardiler's Bates Ohio Civil Practice. By permission of
the publishers, The W. H. Anderson Company, Cincinnati, Ohio].
1 Babbitt v. Bumpus, 73 IMich. 331, 41 N. W. 417 (1889).
The term "gross negligence," when used in reference to liability of an
attorney to his client, means want or absence of reasonable care and skill:
Glenn v. Haynes, 191 Va. 574, 66 S. E. 2d 509 (1951).
2 Spangler v. Sellers, 5 F. 882 (C. C., S. D. Ohio, 1881).
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in good faith and in the honest belief that his advice and acts are
well founded and in the best interest of his client, he is not answerable for a mere error of judgment or mistake in a point of
law which has not been settled by the court of last resort in his
state, and on which reasonable doubt may be entertained by
well informed lawyers.8
It is well settled by high courts of England and of this
country that every client employing an attorney has a right to
the exercise on the part of the attorney of ordinary care and
diligence in the execution of the business entrusted to him, and
to a fair average degree of professional skill and knowledge; and
if the attorney has not as much of these qualities as he ought to
possess and which, by holding himself out for employment he
impliedly represents himself as possessing, or if, having them,
he has neglected to employ them, the law makes him responsible for the loss or damage which has accrued to his client for
4
their deficiency or failure of application.
A lawyer, by engaging, undertakes to conduct the business
in the usual way, not for the judgment of the court.5
An attorney owes to his client fidelity, secrecy, diligence
and skill. He cannot represent conflicting interests or undertake
6
to discharge conflicting duties.
Transactions between attorney and client
The relation of attorney and client is confidential in nature,
and any contract entered into between them while such relationship continues, whereby the attorney obtains any advantage over
the client, is presumed to have been made by the client under
undue influence of the attorney. 7 All transactions between attorney and client are regarded with suspicion and disfavor, are
discouraged by the policy of the law, and will be closely scrutinized by the courts, which will lean against the attorney.8 The
3 Hodges v. Carter, 239 No. Car. 517, 80 S. E. 2d 144 (1954).
4 Kendall v. Rogers, 181 Md. 606, 31 A. 2d 312 (1943).

5 Gallagher v. Thompson, Wright (Ohio) 466 (1833).
6 People v. Gerold, 265 i. 448, 107 N. E. 165 (1914).
An attorney must exercise the highest degree of good faith in relations
with his client, and must make a full disclosure of all information relative
to the transaction in which he is retained: Laehn Coal, &c., Inc. v. Koehler,
267 Wis. 297, 64 N. W. 2d 823 (1954).
7Plxweve Aircraft Co. v. Greenwood, 141 P. 2d 933 (Calif., 1943).
8 Rothman v. Wilson, 121 F. 2d 1000 (C. C. A. 9,1941).
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burden of establishing the fairness of such transactions is upon
the attorney. 9
However, prior to the relation of attorney and client, a
lawyer may bargain for his services with a prospective client,
and deal with him at arms length. This was held to be so although
the attorney had previously represented the client in litigation
which had successfully terminated. 10
Summary proceedings against attorneys; disbarment
At common law a summary proceeding, by motion, may be
brought against an attorney who wrongfully refuses to turn over
papers, documents or money to his client, even though the money
was not received as the proceeds of a judgment and there is no
case pending before the court." However, where an attorney in
good faith claims funds produced by his services rendered to the
client, for such services, a summary order should not be 12rendered. The proper remedy is by an ordinary action at law.
An Ohio statute provides that an attorney receiving money
for his client, and refusing or neglecting to pay it when demanded, may be proceeded against in a summary way, on mo13
tion.
Disbarment. In Ohio a proceeding to remove or suspend an
attorney from office is strictly statutory. 14 But there is nothing
9 Hunt v. Picklesimer, 290 Ky. 573, 162 S. W. 2d 27 (1942).

In clients' suit to set aside instruments purporting to convey realty to
their attorney, the attorney had burden to show that he had not overreached
clients: Seeley v. Cornell, 90 F. 2d 562 (C. C. A. 5, 1937).
In land owner's action for damages resulting from his attorney's allegedly false representations as to existence of tax lien against the property,
plaintiff had burden to prove the alleged fraud; but where an attorney and
his client have transactions with each other, or enter into some contract
from which the attorney profits, fraud may be inferred, and the attorney
has the burden to show that he dealt fairly with his client, but there were
no such dealings here: Faston v. Chaffee, 16 Wash. 2d 183, 132 P. 2d 1006
(1943).
10 Boldt v. Baker, 13 Ohio App. 125 (1920).
11 Cotton v. Ashley, 11 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 47 (1895) [followed, Mulholland
v. Groot, 24 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. (N. S.) 582, 35 C. D. 16 (1904)].
12 Newcomb v. Krueger, 36 Ohio App. 469, 173 N. E. 246 (1930).
There is no question but that a court may, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, compel an attorney appearing before it to pay over or account for
moneys, or to deliver papers which he has received in his official capacity
and wrongfully withholds from his client. The procedure is by petition or
motion in a civil action in which he is given an opportunity to answer and
defend, and if the attorney in good faith claims funds for services rendered
to the client, the latter is not entitled to a summary order: In re Butler, 137
Ohio St. 115, 17 0. 0. 440, 28 N. E. 2d 196 (1940).
'3 Ohio Rev. Code, § 4705.06.
14 In re Lieberman, 163 Ohio St. 35, 56 0. 0. 23, 125 N. E. 2J 328 (1955).
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inconsistent in following the mode of procedure provided by
statute, and at the same time enlarging the statutory grounds
of the inherent powers possessed
for disbarment by the exercise
15
matters.
these
in
courts
by
Malpractice actions against attorneys
Considering the immensity of the matters in which trust is
reposed in lawyers by clients, business and personal alike, the
comparative dearth of malpractice actions against attorneys
would seem to testify that the great majority of lawyers maintain
a high ethical standard and are not wanting in reasonable diligence in respect to matters entrusted to them.
Those few members of the profession who are derelict in
their duty often escape liability on account of the inability of the
client to prove damage or proximate cause. By the weight of
authority, if a lawyer neglects to prosecute an action, interpose
a defense, or properly perfect an appeal, in order to recover
against him the client must prove that he had a good cause of
action or defense, or that the judgment would have been reversed if the appeal had been perfected. This is undoubtedly
sound law, but it casts an almost insuperable burden upon the
erstwhile client. As said by one court, in a malpractice action
resulting from the failure of an attorney to take an appeal from
a judgment against his client:
"It is true that this involves certain difficulties, not the least
of which is to try to convince one trial judge that another judge
of equal jurisdiction rendered such an erroneous judgment that
it would have been reversed on appeal had one been taken." I
This objection, however, was met by one state court of last
resort by reviewing the record of the case, in which the attorney
was alleged to have been negligent in failing to settle a bill of
exceptions, for the purpose of determining whether or not there
2
was reversible error.
In re McBride, 164 Ohio St. 119, 58 0. 0. 242, 132 N. E. 2d 113 (1956).
The proceeding is not a criminal prosecution: State ex rel. Joseph v.
Crossland, 152 Ohio St. 199, 40 0. 0. 174, 88 N. E. 2d 289 (1949).
Procuring admission to the bar by fraudulent means is ground for disbarment: State ex rel. Turner v. Albin, 11 Ohio St. 527, 161 N. E. 792 (1928).
1 Pete v. Henderson, 124 Calif. App. 2d 487, 269 P. 2d 78 (1954). It was held,
however, that although it might be difficult to make such proof, that is no
ground for denying the right to present the proof, if it can be made, and
that it would not be a collateral attack upon the judgment in the former
action.
2 General Accident Fire &c. Corp. v. Cosgrove, 257 Wis. 25, 42 N. W. 2d 155
(1950), where it was said that this requirement "appears to place a fairly
15
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The petition or complaint in an action for malpractice must
allege the relation of attorney and client, and pertinent facts
which disclose the dereliction of a duty by the attorney, and
support the claims of injury; negligence with reference to such
facts, of a character to suggest that the injury may have flowed
therefrom, and allegations of damage constituting the proximate
result of the negligence alleged; and, unless the connection between the successive propositions and elements be apparent from
the statement of them, the pleading must inform the court by
additional averments how one element flows into another; that
is, the nexus must be obvious or specially pleaded. Thus, a petition alleging the retaining of an attorney to secure for the plaintiff the appointment as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband; the death of the husband's brother testate, devising his ancestral property to his mother, who failed to probate the will until after the three-year statute of forfeiture of
devise had run; the attorney's knowledge of the will of the
brother, and his neglect to inform the plaintiff and the court of
the fact of such forfeiture, and failure thereby to secure plaintiff's appointment as administratrix of her husband's estate, and
alleging damages as a result thereof, does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for malpractice.3
In an action against an attorney for negligence, the erstwhile
client must allege and prove the attorney's employment by the
client, his neglect of a reasonable duty, and that such negligence
was the proximate cause of loss to the client. Thus, where a
declaration alleged that the plaintiffs had been the owners of a
farm which they sold to one M, under a deed containing a "covenant of special warranty," which obligated the grantors to protect the grantee against acts impairing the title during the holding of the property by the grantors, but not against such acts by
(Continued from preceding page)
heavy burden upon the plaintiff in this case, but, as pointed out by the
trial court, the law is well established in the courts of this country. This
burden plaintiff accepts." The conclusion was, however, that the record in
the first action did not disclose reversible error.
3 Long v. Bowersox, 8 Ohio Nisi Prius Rep. (N. S.) 249, 19 0. D. 494 (1909).
It would seem evident that the failure of the attorney to inform the plaintiff
and the court of the forfeiture of the devise by the mother of plaintiff's
brother-in-law, would in no way result in failure to secure for plaintiff
the administration of her husband's estate. Plaintiff might have had a cause
of action against her attorney for failure to secure for her part or all of
her brother-in-law's property, upon the forfeiture of his mother, assuming
that her husband was the heir at law of his brother, which he apparently
was, and she might have also had a cause of action against her second
lawyer for failure to properly cast her cause of action.
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their predecessors in title; that said M later mortgaged the property to the plaintiffs, and then entered into a contract with one
C whereby the latter was to purchase the property but refused
to perform on account of defects of title caused by acts before
plaintiffs acquired the property; that M, plaintiffs' grantee and
later mortgagor, "employed defendant attorney" to have the
title cleared, and that such attorney told plaintiffs that it was
their duty and "legal responsibility" to see that the title to the
farm was good in M, their grantee, and that pursuant to such
advice they made a substantial reduction in the mortgage debt
and cancelled the mortgage; that the attorney in accounting
charged plaintiffs a fee of two hundred dollars for his services in
having the title cleared, failed to state a cause of action against
the attorney, for the reason he had not been employed by the
plaintiffs, but was employed by M, although the attorney gave
to the plaintiffs incorrect legal advice.4
Before a client will be entitled to anything more than nominal damages on account of his attorney negligently permitting a
default judgment against the client, the latter must affirmatively
show what defense he proposed to make, and that it would have
availed. Where general counsel for a client submitted to local
counsel an answer to a petition, to which answer a demurrer was
sustained, and a default judgment later entered for failure of the
local attorney to plead over, it was held that there was no cause
of action against the local attorney in behalf of the client. The
sustaining of the demurrer to the answer was evidence of the
fact that the defense interposed was not valid. 5
Where an attorney accepted employment to prosecute an
action for the plaintiff and the plaintiff recovered judgment in
the cotert of origin, which judgment was reversed by a state
district court, and the plaintiff's attorney then prosecuted error
to the state supreme court, which proceeding was dismissed for
failure of the attorney to file a motion for new trial in the district court, in a malpractice action by the former client against
the attorney in a federal court, that court held that there was
negligence on the part of the attorney in failing to file the motion
for new trial, but that in order to show damage, or proximate
cause of damage, it was incumbent upon the former client to
establish that if the supreme court of the state had reviewed
4 Kendall

v. Rogers, 181 Md. 606, 31 A. 2d 312 (1943).

5 Western &c. Life Ins. Co. v. Selzer, 23 Ohio Cir. Ct. (N. S.) 104, 34 C. D.

146 [alid, without opin., 90 Ohio St. 411, 108 N. E. 1134 (1914)].
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the case on the merits it would have reversed the district court.
After reviewing a number of decisions in other states to that
effect, the federal court held that the attorney was not liable.6
Where the plaintiff lost a suit on a fire insurance policy, by
reason of failure of his attorney to secure valid service of process
on the state insurance commissioner, the attorney was exonerated, on the ground that the law had not been well settled as to
the method of such service until the decision of the court of last
resort in the principal case in which the negligence was alleged
7
to have been committed.
Where an attorney had instituted an action in a Maryland
court for wrongful death under the Maryland statute, and advised his client, the administrator, to reject an offer of settlement, which the client did, and the case was lost for the reason
there were no beneficiaries within the provision of the Maryland
statute, in an action by such administrator against the attorney
alleging expenditures in prosecuting the death action, it was held
that there was no basis for recovery in the absence of a showing that the administrator had informed the attorney of the relationship of the alleged beneficiaries, who were stepmother and
stepsisters, and without the terms of the statute.8
An attorney failed to interpose certain defenses to an action,
as he had agreed with his client. Default judgment was rendered against the client. It was held that there was no liability
against the attorney, since the defenses proposed by the client
were without merit. 9
Where, in attempting to perfect an appeal, the attorney failed
to timely file a statement of facts furnished by the client, which
statement was stricken, in a subsequent action for malpractice,
the client's failure to allege that had the statement been duly
filed the client could or would have obtained a more favorable
result upon appeal, rendered the complaint defective for failure
10
to state a cause of action.
An attorney is not liable where his negligence was not the
proximate cause of the injury to the client. Client was surety on
a note on which a judgment was rendered against him and the
makers. Client's attorney took a second trial under the statute,
6 Spangler v. Sellers, 5 F. 882 (D. C., Ohio, 1881).
7 Hodges v. Carter, 239 No. Car. 517, 80 S. E. 2d 144 (1954).
8 Neosi v. Aiello, 69 A. 2d 57 (Mun. App., D. C., 1949).
9 Haggerty v. Watson, 302 N. Y. 707, 98 N. E. 2d 586 (1951).
10 Laux v. Woodworth, 195 Wash. 550, 81 P. 2d 531 (1938).
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which necessitated the posting of a bond. The attorney being
busy at the time, instructed his client to have the clerk of the
court fill out the bond, which was done. The bond, so filled
out, recited that it was conditioned for payment of judgment
"against all defendants." On second trial judgment was again
rendered against the makers of the note, but in favor of clientsurety, who was then sued on the bond and paid the judgment
erroneously rendered thereon. In an action for malpractice
against the attorney, it was held that the legal effect of the bond
was that it was conditioned only for payment of any judgment
which might be rendered against the former client, who posted
the same, as had been held by the state supreme court; that the
judgment against the client on the bond was erroneous, and,
therefore, that the negligence of the attorney in not supervising
the preparation of the bond was not the proximate cause of
client's loss in suffering judgment on the bond."
An attorney is not liable to a third party by reason of his
dereliction. The owner's agent left notes and a mortgage with
an attorney for collection. Later the agent signed an order on
the attorney to deliver the proceeds of the notes and mortgage
to certain bankers. The attorney signed an acceptance of the
order, which the agent wrongfully used for his own benefit, to
the detriment of the bankers. In an action by the bankers against
the attorney for breach of implied warranty of the agent's authority to use the acceptance for his own credit, the attorney
12
was held not liable.
Where an attorney, without authority, accepted horses in
payment and satisfaction of a judgment in favor of his client,
the client ratified the act by suing the attorney for the property
instead of disaffirming the act and proceeding to have the satisfaction of the judgment vacated. 13
An attorney who successfully bid on realty at a sheriff's sale
in behalf of his client, but failed to make disclosure to the client
of certain defects in title before making the bid, was not liable.
It was held that proof that the client would have acted otherwise
had he known the facts was a prerequisite to his recovery against
the attorney. 14
11 Harter v. Morris, 18 Ohio St. 492 (1869).
12 Keys v. Follett, 41 Ohio St. 535 (1885).
13 Christy v. Douglas, Wright (Ohio) 485 (1834).
14 Laehn Coal &c. Inc. v. Koehler, 267 Wis. 297, 64 N. W. 2d 823 (1954).
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A former client, seeking to recover from an attorney for
negligence in failing to perform a specified act, must plead and
prove that if the attorney had performed the act it would have
resulted beneficially to the client. Demurrer sustained to complaint which alleged that the attorney failed to file a petition for
his client's discharge in bankruptcy, but which failed to allege
that if the petition had been fied the client would have been
entitled to the discharge. In behalf of the former client it was
argued that the granting of discharge in bankruptcy on the filing
of a petition therefor is mandatory, unless the client has committed certain prohibited acts, which would be an affirmative
defense on the part of the attorney in the malpractice action.
The court held that, to negative these prohibited acts is an essential part of the cause of action for malpractice, which must be
alleged in the complaint.16
An action in which negligence of the attorney was alleged
was against two physicians, for damages for signing the certificate
on which the plaintiff was committed to a state hospital. Verdict
was rendered for the physicians. In a later action for malpractice
against the attorney, the former client asserted three acts of
negligence: (1) failure to make the state's attorney a party defendant in the action against the physicians; (2) failure to offer
in evidence in that case copies of certain correspondence of
client; and (3) failure to call all of the client's witnesses. The
court held that the client, being present at the trial against the
physicians, knew that the state's attorney was not a party defendant, and that the record failed to show the nature of the
claimed cause of action against him; that not only was there a
failure to show wherein the copies of the correspondence would
have been beneficial to the client's case, but such copies, which
were in the record, would have been detrimental to her if offered
and received in evidence; and, as to failure to call all of her witnesses, that she did not testify in the malpractice suit against the
attorney as to what witnesses were not called, or what their
testimony would have established had they been called. Some
eighteen witnesses testified for her in the suit against the physicians. The action against the attorney was also barred by the
three-year statute of linitations.6
An attorney was sued by his former client for the return of
the compensation paid him by the client, and the value of certain
15

Feldesman v. McGovern, 44 Calif. App. 2d 566, 112 P. 2d 645 (1941).

16 Case v. Ricketts, 41 A. 2d 304 (Mun. App., D. C., 1945).
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bonds involved, for failure to argue and brief as agreed a petition for a writ of certiorari presented in behalf of the client to
the Supreme Court of the United States in an action to recover
against a national bank on an alleged agreement to repurchase
the bonds. Judgment in favor of the attorney was affirmed, for
failure of the complaint to show that the plaintiff would have
recovered against the bank had the case been argued and briefed
17
as agreed.
A petition for malpractice against attorneys alleged that,
after the end of litigation to collect two notes for the plaintiff,
resulting in the plaintiff securing a life interest in certain realty,
subject to a prior life estate, the defendants, as attorneys, continued to represent the plaintiff; that they misrepresented and
concealed facts as to the value of such life estate, and wrongfully induced her to sell the same for $2700, which could have
been sold for $11,200. The complaint was subject to demurrer
for failure to state a cause of action, in that it did not show any
monetary damage resulted to the plaintiff, there being no allegation that at the time of sale of the life interest there was any one,
other than the purchasing corporation, who was ready, willing
and able to buy such interest for any sum, or who had indicated
any desire to buy it.'8 The petition did allege, however, that the
attorneys knew that the life interest could have been sold for
the sum alleged, and that within a month thereafter the purchaser sold it for such sum, and that the attorneys, in effect,
fraudulently connived with the purchaser, to their profit.
A petition against an attorney for failure to prosecute an
action must state facts showing that the client had'a good cause
of action to be prosecuted by the attorney. An allegation of
wrongful failure to prosecute an action in behalf of the mother
for the wrongful death of her minor son, was held to be insufficient, without an allegation that the son had no wife or children
entitled by the wrongful death statute to first institute the action,
or a father entitled by such statute to institute a joint action with
the mother. 19
During the trial of a stockholders' derivative action against
an officer and director of the corporation and others, wherein
the first cause of action sought to determine the validity and
effect of an agency agreement between the corporation and its
17 Kimen v. Ettelson, 303 111. App. 230, 24 N. E. 2d 871 (1940).
18 Clary v. McRae, 60 Ga. App. 2d 419, 18 S. E. 2d 70 (1941).

19 Johnson v. Haskins, 119 S. W. 2d 235 (Mo., 1938).
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said officer and director, and, by the second cause of action, to
enjoin the execution of a proposed agreement to be made by the
corporation with another corporation for the production of television, radio and motion picture shows, at the close of the plaintiffs' case, on motion of the attorney for the officer-director, the
first cause of action was dismissed; but the trial judge indicated
his belief that the execution of the contract in question should
be enjoined, for the reason that the defendant officer "seeks in
that contract an advantage for himself that an honorable man
would not seek." The following day the attorney for the officerdefendant informed the court that, pursuant to his client's instructions, the contract would be withdrawn and would not be
executed. The second cause of action was thereupon dismissed
as academic. In a later action by the officer against his attorney
for malpractice, it was alleged that the attorney was negligent in
the stockholders' action in failing to present witnesses who would
have testified that such a contract was customary in the industry.
In affirming the judgment dismissing the complaint against the
attorney, the Special Term stated that "it is evident that such
testimony would not have affected [the trial judge's] reactions to
the contract between said corporation and the plaintiff here, a
director of said corporation." Judgment affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, without opinion.20
Not all malpractice actions, however, result favorably to the
attorney involved.
It was said that an attorney is not bound to undertake to
render services for another without compensation, and if he
voluntarily undertakes to do so, he is liable for the consequences
of his negligence, and cannot plead lack of consideration for the
services, as a defense. Where a client's jewelry was delivered
to her attorney for safe keeping, and he placed it in his safe at
his residence, where it was stolen, in an action in detinue by the
client against the attorney, upon the client establishing title and
right to possession of the jewelry, and showing delivery thereof
to the attorney, and failure of the attorney to redeliver it upon
demand, a prima facie case for recovery was made, and the
not
burden shifted to the attorney to show that non-delivery was 21
due to failure to use reasonable care. Question for the jury.
20
21

Storer v. Miller, 2 N. Y. 2d 817 (1957).
Glenn v. Haynes, 192 Va. 574, 66 S. E. 2d 509 (1951).
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In an action against a national corporation for maintaining
a nuisance, causing great damage to near-by farms, attorneys
represented to their clients that other clients "similarly situated"
would pay part of the costs of litigation. This was not done.
After the recovery of $60,000 for the clients, and after claims of
others "similarly situated" were settled for $140,000, the attorneys sued their clients who maintained the litigation, for the
balance of the costs of litigation. The clients counterclaimed for
the amount of expenses which they had paid, alleging that the
attorneys were without authority to represent that others "similarly situated" would pay part of the expense. Judgment against
22
the attorneys for about $12,000 affirmed.
A complaint against attorneys, alleging that they represented
the plaintiff in presenting his application to the patent office;
that the attorneys gave to the plaintiff incorrect legal advice, and
failed to give him full and accurate information; that they
neglected to make all of the "claims" available to his invention,
and that they did these things fraudulently and to benefit competitors of the plaintiff, as the result of which he suffered large
money damages by being compelled to pay attorney fees to
others, and because persons other than the plaintiff in this and
foreign countries were enabled, without license from plaintiff,
to use parts or features of his invention, stated a cause of action
for negligence, breach of implied contract and constructive
23
fraud.
A client held a mortgage for $16,000, which was "tainted
with usury." On advice of counsel, the mortgage was extended,
and an additional $14,000 was advanced by the client, for which
a new mortgage was executed. Both mortgages, amounting to
$30,000, were ordered cancelled on foreclosure, on account of
usury. A case of malpractice against the attorneys was made for
24
the jury.
The measure of damages suffered by a client purchasing
realty, resulting from breach of contract of the attorney to examine title, would generally include the full amount of the purchase price paid by the client, and interest within the discretion
of the jury, whether the title was conveyed to the purchaser or
to his nominee. The liability, however, is founded in contract,
22

Schafer v. Fraser, 290 P. 2d 190 (Ore., 1955).

23

Dulberg v. Mock, 1 N. Y. 2d 54, 133 N. E. 2d 695 (1956).

24

Werle v. Rumsey, 278 N. Y. 186, 15 N. E. 2d 572 (1938).
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and does not generally extend beyond the person by whom the
25
attorney is employed.
A statement of claim against an attorney, which alleged that
the plaintiff engaged the attorney to file an answer to a petition
to show cause why an attachment should not issue against the
plaintiff, to represent the plaintiff at the hearing on the petition
to show cause, and to file a petition to reinstate a petition to open
a final decree in equity obtained by the plaintiff's wife against
him, and, if such measures failed, to file for the client a petition
in insolvency, for which the attorney accepted a retainer, but
failed to render any of such services, resulting in the plaintiff
26
being imprisoned, stated a cause of action.
Statute of limitations
In Ohio the statute of limitations for malpractice is one year,
which is applied to actions for malpractice against attorneys,1
and the cause of action accrues at the date of the act or neglect
complained of. 2 In some states different statutes are applied, depending on whether or not the action is founded on negligence
or breach of contract, or on some other theory.3
Wlodarek v. Thrift, 178 Md. 453, 13 A. 2d 774 (1940).
Lichow v. Sowers, 334 Pa. 353, 6 A. 2d 285 (1939).
This case is not in accord with the weight of authority to the effect that
a showing must be made that the acts neglected would have been successful,
if they had been performed.
I Long v. Bowersox, 9 Ohio Nisi Prius (N. S.) 249, 19 0. D. 494 (1909).
2 Galloway v. Hood, 69 Ohio App. 278, 24 0. 0. 66, 43 N. E. 2d 631 (1941).
3 Cf. Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 3 App. Div. 2d 686 (N. Y.); 159
N. Y. S. 2d 95 (1957); and Bland v. Smith, 197 Tenn. 683, 277 S. W. 2d 377,
49 A. L. R. 2d 1212 (1955).
Where an attorney collects money for his client, and uses no fraud or
falsehood to him in regard to its receipt, the six-year statute of limitations
applies, and begins to run from the time of its collection: Douglas v. Corry,
46 Ohio St. 349, 21 N. E. 440 (1889).
25
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